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 In his 2013 book, “Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them,” 
Joshua Greene1 contemplates two tragedies.  The first is the tragedy of the commons, a well-
studied problem in the game theory and psychology literature.  Here, if people are truly self-
interested, cooperation cannot arise, and everyone will use the commons until it is depleted. This 
problem is succinctly called the “Me vs. Us” problem.  The second is the tragedy of the 
commonsense morality, which Greene named, refers to the problem of cooperation among 
groups, the “Us vs. Them” problem.   
 Greene argues evolution has equipped us with the mental tools (our emotions, the ability 
to infer ingroup vs. outgroup, etc.) to solve the “Me vs. Us” problem.  Still, it did not give us the 
same resource to solve for the inter-group conflicts, given that each group often has a different 
set of moral norms, intuitions, and sacred values.  Based on the new empirical sciences of how 
people form moral intuitions and make a moral judgment, Greene argues that to solve this 
problem, we must rely on a “deep pragmatism,” a form of universal utilitarianism, where we 
should make moral decision to maximize the happiness of everyone and everyone has an 
impartial claim on happiness.  
 I think in the tragedy of commonsense morality, I think Greene has overemphasized three 
things: the role of biological evolution, the role of the group, and the role of the new empirical 
sciences of the mind (neuroscience, cognitive science, game theory, economics, etc.) in the 
process of moral negotiation.  
First, when it comes to evolution, the question over whether groups or individuals are the 
basic units of evolution is often invoked whenever the issue of the group arises (see Robert 
Sapolsky’s 2017 book, Behave’s chapter 103).  So, I wonder what happens in the mind of each 
individual who encounters people in other cultures who need to decide whether to act out their 
own norms or to comply with the norms of others.  I believe the same moral tools that evolution 
equips us to cooperate in the case of the tragedy of the commons, i.e., reason, calculation, 
empathy, compassion, must be utilized.  Thus, the claim that evolution has not prepared us for 
the “Us vs. Them” problem is misguided.  
Then, throughout history, people have always adopted and mixed values and create a new 
value system. This process has been explored extensively in the domain of cultural studies3,4 and 
management5.  Perhaps, the discussion of how moral judgment and intuition are formed can 
benefit from the new developments of concepts such as cultural addivity3,4 and global 
mindsponge5.  I guess Greene might be over-optimistic that the new empirical sciences of the 
mind will answer all the moral questions. Surely, truly hard data from experiments can tell us a 
lot about human minds.  Still, without a deep appreciation of cultural nuances from the 
researchers, one can always question whether the hard data are really hard after all.  
Later, in the 2007 paper in Science Magazine, Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, and Richard 
Davis have eloquently argued for the importance of acknowledging the opposition’s sacred 
values through symbolic concessions in conflict resolution6.  Perhaps these kinds of conflicts 
over sacred values are in Greene’s mind when he writes his book.  Yet, these conflicts are on the 
extreme end of cultural conflict, and it is important to acknowledge that solving these conflicts 
are as important as they are extreme.  Nowadays, in the globalized world, every day, we have a 
multitude of lower-grade cultural conflicts that take place and get solved in both the physical and 
digital places.  
I believe a more mature science of the mind will need to take into account these everyday 
actions.  
 Perhaps, the subsequent research themes can be put as “studying the triumph of 
commonsense morality is as important as understanding its tragedy.”  Its manifestations can be 
diverse and vivid such as “tragedy of errors” 7 or “reinforcing self-correction mechanism” 8.   
 After all, these themes, in combination with Greene’s morality discourse, will likely 
advocate Alberts et al. ’s arguments for science and its values9 in the course of development for 
the humankind. 
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